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TOPICAL SURVEY

AVIATION - WARSAW CONVENTION - AIR CARRIER'S LIABILITY FOR "ACCIDENTS" UNDER ARTICLE
17 DEFINED TO EXCLUDE INJURY CAUSED BY ROUTINE REPRESSURIZATION OF JET AIRCRAFT
Warshaw v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 400 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
Cyrus H. Warshaw, a passenger on a Trans World Airlines, Inc.
(TWA) flight from Philadelphia to London on October 13, 1973
experienced a blockage in his left ear which he was unable to clear during
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the course of the flight. After disembarking from the aircraft, Warshaw
realized that he had totally lost his hearing in that ear. Warshaw and his
wife instituted suit against TWA in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, claiming damages in accordance
with the Warsaw Convention' [hereinafter referred to as the Convention],
as modified by the Montreal Interim Agreement.2 The court found, based
on the medical expert testimony introduced at trial, that Warshaw's
injury was proximately caused by the cabin repressurization of the
aircraft during its descent to Heathrow Airport. 3 The issue of the air
carrier's liability depended upon whether cabin repressurization qualified
as an "accident" within the context of the Convention, the initial
prerequisite for liability. The court declared this as a case of first
impression and held that the routine repressurization of a jet aircraft
cabin, during the plane's descent from a high altitude to land, is not to be

1. The Warsaw Convention is officially titled, "The Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air,"

opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11

(adherence of United States proclaimed Oct. 29, 1934). For a thorough discussion of

the Convention, see Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw
Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn]. See Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
2. As originally drafted, article 22(1) of the Warsaw Convention limited the
air carrier's liability to approximately $8,300 in American currency. Dissatisfaction with the low liability limits led to the Hague Conference in 1955, where the
Hague Protocol was drafted, raising the liability limits to approximately $16,600.
The United States, still discontented with the liability limitations, refused to ratify
the Protocol. In 1965, a convention was held in Montreal, which again was
unsuccessful in establishing liability limitation provisions acceptable to the United
States. At that time, the United States denounced the Warsaw Convention under
the authority provided by article 39 of the Convention. 53 DEP'T. STATE BULL. No.
924 (1965). With the threat of the United States' denunciation, the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the International Air Traffic Association
(IATA) immediately proposed new provisions acceptable to the United States in
the Montreal Interim Agreement, which led the United States to withdraw its
denunciation notice. Agreement CAB 18900, Approved, CAB Order No. E-23680,
31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966), reprintedin 49 U.S.C.A. § 1502 note. The Montreal Interim
Agreement is a contractual modification of the Warsaw Convention which does not
have the binding effect of a treaty; it does not amend the treaty provisions until it
has been ratified as an amendment to the treaty. The United States Senate has not
ratified the Montreal Interim Agreement. The Agreement bypassed the treaty
amendment procedures when the carriers changed their tariffs via the article 22(1)
provisions. See article 22(1), supra note 1. See also 442 F. Supp. at 406, 407, infra,
note 3. For a detailed discussion of the Montreal Interim Agreement, see Lowenfeld
& Mendelsohn, supra note 1.
3. 442 F. Supp. at 407.
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viewed as an accident which is actionable for purposes of article 17 of the
Convention. 4 The holding hinged upon the condition that the descent was
accomplished in a normal, customary fashion, without any complications
or external disruptions, and in accordance with the customarily
5
anticipated and preplanned manner of execution.
Prior to the court's determination of the proximate cause of the
injury, the defendant had stipulated that the cabin pressure system
operated in the normal fashion and that no other malfunctions existed on
board the aircraft at the time of the plaintiffs injury.6 It was further
established, based on a medical expert's testimony that, "[Tihe cause of
deafness was a traumatic injury to the inner ear nerves, which was
caused by the unequalized pressure change displacing the eardrum,
attached bones and prosthesis so that the prosthesis penetrated into the
inner ear." 7 Warshaw's hearing was found to be within the normal range
upon boarding the aircraft albeit he had undergone a stapedectomy to the
left ear thirteen years prior to this occurrence and was suffering from a
cold at the time of the flight. Judge Fogel determined that while the
plaintiffs physical predisposition may have been one factor contributing
to the injury, it was not the sole cause and that the injury could still have
occurred in the absence of such a condition.8 In its holding, the court thus
relied exclusively upon the cabin repressurization as the sole proximate
cause of Warshaw's injury. 9
4. Id. at 412.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 404.
7. Id. at 405.
8. Id.
9. Id. Perhaps the physical predisposition of the plaintiff should not have
been dismissed by the court since it might have been an important consideration in

determining the cause of plaintiffs injury for purposes of determining if an
accident occurred. One author who discussed a similar factual situation,
approached the analysis from a different perspective, stating:
[T]he carrier is liable for damage sustained as a result of an accident, in
the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily

injury suffered by a passenger. There must be a causal relation between
the "accident" and the damage and when the Warsaw Convention is
correctly interpreted only such a harmful event may be deemed an
"accident" which is not only in connection with carriage by air but directly
results from it. Undoubtedly the carrier will not be liable for an injury
caused by a passenger to another passenger, e.g. in the course of a flight.
The carrier is equally not liable if the damage arose from an event which
cannot be deemed an "accident" in air traffic [an acute illness, e.g., a heart
attack, a cerebral stroke or a miscarriage during the flight, etc.]. From this
angle, it is possible to consider very problematic the decision rendered by
the American City Court of Queen's County, New York, in June, 1951, in re
H.G. Philios v. TWA: the court awarded damages to the plaintiff who
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Warshaw's contention that his injury was an "accident" within the
ordinary usage of the word 10 was undeniably valid, however, the issue
posed by the court was, whether this "accident" or occurrence was the
type of "accident" covered by the terms of the Convention. Recovery
under the Convention is dependent on the initial invocation of article 17,
which requires that an "accident" has occurred on board an aircraft or
during embarking or disembarking." Since the word "accident" was not
defined within the context of the Convention, the court followed the
established route for treaty interpretation by examining the legislative
history of the treaty, pertinent legal interpretations employed by other
12
courts and subsequent acts of the contracting parties.
The Warsaw Convention was designed to create uniformity in dealing
with passengers and airline carriers engaged in international air travel
by limiting the international carrier's liability for damages sustained by
passengers during the course of a flight or during embarkation or
disembarkation.1 3 To protect the carrier from the economic consequences
of a catastrophic accident, its liability was limited to approximately
$8,300 in U.S. currency, with a two-year statute of limitations. 4 The
injured passenger has the burden of proving the invocation of the

during a flight from Rome to Athens on board an aircraft without a
pressurized cabin, suffered a rupture of the ear-drum and bleeding from the
ear; none of the passengers suffered a similar injury and an expert
ascertained that the plaintiff had been ill with a bad inflammation of the
upper respiratory organs. It is impossible to agree with this decision,
because no "accident" within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention was

concerned and in addition the plaintiff was predisposed to an injury of the
ear-drum and her condition was not good enough for carriage by air.
M.

MILDE, THE PROBLEMS OF LIABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE BY AIR,

STUDY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw,

58-59 (Albert Kafka, transl. 1965).

A

10. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 11 (1976) which
defines "accident" as:
an event or condition occurring by chance or arising from unknown or
remote causes; a lack of intention or necessity; chance often opposed to

design; an unforeseen, unplanned event or condition; a sudden event or
change occurring without intent or volition through carelessness, unawareness, grievance, or a combination of causes and producing an unfortunate

result.

See also THE

OXFORD ENGLISH

DICTIONARY, vol. 1 at 55 (1933) which defines

"accident" as "anything that happens. An occurrence, incident, event. Anything
that happens without foresight or expectation; an unusual or known cause; a
casualty, a contingency."
11. See supra note 1.
12. Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d at
13. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 498-99.

14. Id.

337.
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Convention, via article 17, which creates a separate cause of action.' 5 And
in negligence actions, while there was a presumption of fault on the
carrier, it was free to raise the defenses of due care and contributory
6
negligence.'
The Montreal Interim Agreement was later designed to raise the
limits of liability under article 22(1) of the Convention to approximately
$75,000 in U.S. currency."7 In addition, absolute liability standards were
created under article 17 of the Convention, thereby eliminating the
carrier's defense of due care under article 20(1).18 The carrier's defense of
contributory negligence under article 21 of the Convention was retained.
The Guatemala Protocol of 1971, a relatively recent conference
proposing to amend the Convention, raised the issue of whether an air
carrier must become the absolute insurer of the health of its passengers. 9
The adopted version of the Guatemala Protocol, which the United States
Senate has not ratified, would change article 17 to read:
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or personal
injury of a passenger upon condition only that the event which
caused the death or injury took place on board the aircraft or in the
course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.
However, the carrier is not liable if the death or injury resulted solely
from the state of health of the passenger (emphasis added).2

15. 442 F. Supp. at 405. The parties to this action stipulated that article 17 of
the Convention gives rise to a cause of action and establishes a basis of liability.
See supra note 13. In MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402,1404 (1st Cir. 1971),
the United States Court of Appeals stated that the first requirement for the
invocation of the Convention is to find an accident under article 17.
16. See supra note 1, article 20(1), 49 Stat. at 3019 (defense of due care) and
article 21, 49 Stat. at 3019 (contributory negligence defense).
17. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1 at 596-99. See supra note 2.
18. See supra note 1, at 599-601.
19. The official title of the convention is, "A Protocol to Amend the
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Pertaining to International
Carriage by Air," March 1971, ICAO Doc. 8932. The Protocol of Guatemala City,
signed March 8, 1971 has contractually modified the Warsaw Convention and
interim agreements by raising the liability limits for death or personal injury to
$100,000 and makes this limit "unbreakable" with the option of supplementary
indemnity for the contracting country. By establishing an "unbreakable" limit,
article 25, which allows unlimited liability for acts of wilful misconduct by the
carrier or its agents was discarded. The only defenses available to the carrier are
contributory negligence and the state of health of the passenger or the latent defect
of his baggage. See 442 F. Supp. at 410-412. For a detailed discussion of the
Guatemala Protocol, see Mankiewicz, The 1971 Protocol of Guatemala City to
Further Amend the 1929 Warsaw Convention, 38 J. AIR L. & CoM. 519 (1972).
20. Guatemala Protocol, supra note 19.
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Although the Guatemala Protocol does not have the authority of a
modification or amendment to article 17 of the Convention, thus not
controlling law in this case, it serves as an important tool of legislative
interpretation of those matters arising in futuro which were not
contemplated by the original drafters.2"
Unable to glean sufficient interpretational guidance from the textual
language or the legislative history of the Convention, the court addressed
the case law, limiting its inquiry to that of the United States. 22 It was
found that no American court has confronted a factual situation in which
an injury was caused during the course of a normal, routine flight. 23 Two
cases cited by the court, Berguido v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,2 1 and Block v.

Compagnie Nationale Air France,25 involved airplane crashes and dealt
only with the issues of the carrier's defense of due care under article 20(1)
of the Convention, and the applicability of the Convention to charter
groups, respectively. In both cases, no one disputed that airplane crashes
were accidents under article 17 and the issue of the interpretation of
"accident" was never raised. Airplane crashes and unexplained disappearances would undisputedly be risks of air travel within the context of
"accident" under article 17, for which the air carrier would be liable
should injuries to passengers ensue, unless the passenger contributed to
26
his own injury by an intentional or negligent act.

The court then examined a set of cases involving injuries occurring
during situations which arose in what would have to be called
nonroutine, abnormal flights, such as hijacking, sabotage and terrorist

21. 442 F. Supp. at 411.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 408.
Id.
369 F.2d 874 (3rd Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 996 (1968).
386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 965 (1968).

26. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra, note 1, at 519-22, where it was
explained that the Warsaw Convention applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to
airplane crashes. The doctrine created a presumption of carrier liability upon the
occurrence of any airplane crash, subject to the defense of due care and
contributory negligence. As the knowledge and experience in the field of aviation
grew in the 1950s and 1960s, Professor W. Prosser was able to conclude that the
safety records established for aviation justified a blanket application of res ipsa
loquitur,or the presumption of the carrier's negligence to all unexplained airplane
crashes or disappearances of aircraft. The Warsaw Convention went one step
further than res ipsa loquiturby shifting the burden of persuasion upon the carrier
to prove non-negligence. Id. With the advent of the Montreal Interim Agreement,
absolute liability standards placed liability on the carrier for all airplane crashes
or airplane disappearances, regardless of fault, unless the carrier raised the
defense of contributory negligence or intentional acts of sabotage of the party
bringing the action.
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attacks.2 7 These cases held that such events were "accidents" within the
context of article 17. The United States District Court of the Southern
District of New York in Husserl held that a "hijacking" was an
"accident" stressing that acts of sabotage, intentionally performed by
third parties, were contemplated at the Montreal Convention and were
later incorporated within the Agreement by the carriers.2" The Montreal
Agreement expressly reserved the carrier's rights and liabilities against
wilful acts of others causing injury to any passengers.
Two final cases discussed in Warshaw, exemplifying accidental
injuries sustained in a nonroutine manner involved falls. In Chutter v.
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 29 the plaintiff had boarded the aircraft and
had been escorted to her seat by the stewardess. The plaintiff then
decided to return to the entrance doorway of the plane to wave a final
farewell to her family. Stepping out on the entrance ramp, at the exact
moment that the ramp was being removed, she fell. In Chutter, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
concluded that this occurrence was an "accident" within the context of
article 17 of the Convention, but dismissed the action based on the
carrier's article 21 defense of contributory negligence and on the running
3
of the statute of limitations under article 29(1) of the Convention. 0
In MacDonald v. Air Canada,31 an elderly lady fell unwitnessed at
the baggage section of an airport terminal. The United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit dismissed the suit, holding that there was no
"accident" established in the absence of evidence regarding the
circumstances of the fall. 32 The MacDonald court stated that it was just
as reasonable to assume that some internal condition caused the fall as
that the latter was the result of an accident. The Warshaw court further
construed the MacDonald holding as rendering res ipsa loquitur
inapplicable in situations where proof of an abnormal external factor

27. Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972):
Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Pa. 1975). For i
detailed discussion of Evangelinos and other cases involving the application of
article 17 to accidents caused during embarking and disembarking, see 3 INT'I.
TRADE L. J. 299 (1977).
28. 351 F. Supp. at 707.
29. 132 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
30. Although the carrier may have been negligent in failing to block off the
doorway prior to removing the ramp, negligence per se does not make the flight or
the manner of flight operations nonroutine or abnormal. The circumstances of this
case do not appear to fit neatly within the Warshaw court's analysis of incidents
which are "accidents" under the Convention.
31. 439 F.2d 1402 (lst Cir. 1971).

32. Id. at 1404-05.
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causing or contributing to the injury is absent. 33 The district court
concluded that the MacDonald holding "would not, given its most
generous limits, sustain recovery in the case at bar," since the plaintiff
would necessarily have to prove the existence of an abnormal external
event as the cause of his injury. The proximate cause of Warshaw's
injury, which the court had established as the cabin repressurization, was
functioning in a normal, preplanned manner.
The Warshaw court then concluded that all of the cases cited with the
exception of the MacDonaldcase, involved " 'out-of-the-ordinary' unanticipated incident[s] as the immediate proximate causes of injur[ies]." 34 The
"common thread" which was stated to tie these cases together was the
occurrence of a happening or event which was beyond the normal and
preplanned manner of operation for the flight.35 Based on the district
court's analysis of the United States case law, the circumstances
surrounding Warshaw's injury as applied to the law were not accidental
or abnormal, and the proximate cause of his injury was an ordinary,
normal, preplanned incident, and therefore, not an "accident."
Finally, the district court reviewed the post-Montreal Agreement
documentary material and acts of the contracting parties to aid in the
interpretation of the Convention. 36 Statements made during the subcommittee conference by the drafters of the Guatemala Protocol were
discussed in detail by the Warshaw court. These statements included
expressions that "accident" does not include death or illness from natural
causes, 37 and that in reference to persons, baggage and cargo, absolute
liability provisions should be limited to "airplane accidents" or "risks of
the air." 38 The court then discussed a statement raised by a delegate to
the Guatemala Conference from the United Kingdom, who commented
that in a hypothetical case where a heart attack is brought about by

33. 442 F. Supp. at 410,
34. Id.
35. Id. But see, supra note 29.
36. 442 F. Supp. at 410. See supra note 12.
37. 442 F. Supp. at 411. In addition, the Warshaw court stated that it would
recognize as authoritative one of the reporter's statements to the Guatemala
subcommittee to the effect that "accident" under the Convention should be
interpreted in its ordinary or common-sense meaning of "an untoward event, out of
the ordinary, triggered by some external event, in contrast to an occurrence which
may come about under conditions of normal operation because of inherent
weakness or disability, notwithstanding the absence of any extraordinary external
force or event. But see, supra note 10, for several different definitions of "accident."
Id. at 412.
38. 442 F. Supp. at 412.
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fright from sudden, severe turbulence, the carrier should be liable. 39 He
referred to an injury caused by the combination of a physical infirmity
and an external event as a "borderline" case, which is similar to the
analysis the Warshaw court applied to MacDonald. Based on this
legislative history, the Warshaw court concluded:
[I]t is clear under Article 17 that if the hypothetical passenger's heart
condition were to have been aggravated by the acceleration required
on take-off, or by the deceleration which occurs when landing, such
an occurrence would not be an injury as the result4 of an "accident,"
even under the expanded provisions of Article 17. 0
The District Court concluded that had plaintiffs injury occurred during a
flight which had an abnormality or malfunction in the operation of the
aircraft the court might have decided differently, but that under the
circumstances the plaintiff was prevented from invoking the Convention. 41 Recovery was thus denied Warshaw, and the suit dismissed.
Alternative routes of analysis which the district court might have
employed to reach its conclusion will be briefly discussed. In the
previously decided terrorist and hijacking cases, "accident" was extended
to include intentional acts of third parties. This result was brought about
by liberalizing the traditional rules of construction and focusing not only
on the specific terms involved in the treaty text but also on underlying
policy considerations and the legislative intent of the contracting parties
as expressed in futuro regarding incidents not originally anticipated in
the Convention.4 2 In Husserl, for example, the court stated that the basis
for a liberal construction of article 17 stems from the absolute liability
system established by the Montreal Interim Agreement. 43 With an
absolute liability system, recovery by those parties needing it most would
be maximized and the process expedited. The carrier was recognized as
the party most capable of assessing and insuring against air transportation risks, and of efficiently distributing costs for injuries sustained. 44 The
subsequent 1971 Guatemala Convention followed this view, replacing the
45
term "accident" with "event."
The Warshaw court, however, rejected this approach, perhaps on the
grounds that the liberal construction approach was to be utilized only in
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 413.
42. Id. at 411.
43. See supra note 28.

44. 351 F. Supp. at 707.

45. See supra at 285 and note 19.
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those cases involving specific acts of terrorism and hijacking, which have
underlying policy considerations unique to those limited situations. In
these types of cases, the carrier is the party best able to take preventative
measures to avoid terrorist activities. For example, the carrier may install
metal detection devices in airport terminals to eliminate the carriage of
weaponry onto the aircraft. The underlying policy consideration for
requiring a carrier to bear this risk of loss is different, however, from a
policy requiring it to be a "blanket insurer" of all possible mishaps
aboard the aircraft. By distinguishing the situation in Warshaw from
those which existed in the hijacking and terrorism cases, the court
avoided the result of forcing air carriers to become blanket insurers.
Finally, because allocation of risks and insurance coverage requirements were indeed major underlying policy considerations at the time the
Convention was being drafted, 46 the Warshaw court might have discussed
article 17 coverage in terms of basic insurance principles and considerations. Two distinctions that have been made traditionally in standard
liability insurance policies grew out of the variations in the ordinary
definition of the term "accident." The clearest example of this variation is
found in the Oxford English Dictionary, which defines the term
"accident" as "Anything that happens; an occurrence, incident, event.
Anything that happens without foresight or expectation; an unusual
event, which proceeds from some unknown cause, or is an unusual effect
of a known cause."47 (emphasis added) The distinction between an
accident as a cause of injury or as a result of injury, led to standard
insurance coverage forms for "unexpected loss" and "accidental means."
Unexpected loss coverage was created to exempt from a policy's
coverage "nonaccidents," or losses which occur with such frequency that
they become normal business costs, or which are so foreseeable as to
become calculated risks. 48 The determination of what constitutes an
"unexpected loss" under insurance coverage varies with the individual
circumstances involved, including the foreseeability of the loss, its
recurrence rate, and the risks taken by the insured. 49 For example, in the
area of product liability insurance, a standard form may cover liability
for "occurrences," which are defined as "accidents, including injurious
exposure to conditions, which result, during the policy period, in bodily

46. See generally Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1.
47. See THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 10.
48. See generally, R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAw, ch. 5, §§ 5.4(c)
and (e) (1971).
49. Id. at 299.
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injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the
standpoint of the insured."'
Accidental means insurance coverage limits liability to losses caused
by "accidental means."51 This type of coverage was often used in life
insurance policies and was narrowly enforced. The distinctions between
cause and effect occasionally produced inequitable results, and have since
52
been abolished in most areas of insurance law. Article 17, which states
that an air carrier is liable for personal injuries and damages sustained
"if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on
board the aircraft" clearly appears to be drafted in a form analogous to
accidental means insurance coverage. The intent of the original drafters
of the Convention, and the intentions of subsequent contracting parties to
the Convention appear to support imposition of liability in situations
which involve accidental causes of injury, and not accidental results of
ordinary events and operations. The parties to the Guatemala Protocol
specifically drafted an additional limitation in article 17 to preclude an
air carrier's liability as a "blanket insurer" for physical infirmities of
passengers unrelated to "risks of the air." Based on the analysis of article
17 under basic insurance principles, further support is provided for the
Warshaw holding.
As long as the contracting parties refrain from amending the treaty
to provide otherwise, the result reached in Warshaw appears to be the
most equitable one possible under all the circumstances. The burden of
coming forward with some evidence of an unusual event which caused the
passenger's injury is not to be considered lightly. The modern rules of
discovery, however, should make a potential plaintiffs fact-gathering
responsibilities a manageable task. The advantages which inure to the
benefit of the airlines and thus to all passengers because of this
interpretation are significant. This is particularly true when one realizes
that certain "risks" of air travel, most notably cabin pressurization,
cannot be removed given the present state of technology. The interpretation of the word "accident" in this case is well reasoned and should be
followed in subsequent litigation. 5 1
Sheryl Gandel

50. Id. at 300.
51. Id. at 302-03.
52. Id. at 303-04.
53. 442 F. Supp. at 411. See supra note 19.
54. To date at least one court has applied the reasoning of Warshaw to a
similar set of circumstances. See DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 580
1P.2d 1197 (3rd Cir. 1978).

